This article has been authored by V. K. Ahuja* and Ayushi Verma**
Rules are written without disabled voices, public spaces are built without universal design, examinations are structured without empathy, and workplaces are governed by assumptions of able-bodiedness. In such a landscape, litigation becomes the primary tool for enforcing rights, an unsustainable burden on those already marginalised.
Through a series of transformative judgments, courts in India have moved decisively from a medical model of disability to a rights-based approach, ensuring that social justice becomes a lived reality rather than a constitutional promise preserved only on paper.
Imagine a situation that you are preparing for an important exam, and you are told that you cannot get extra time or a scribe, even though your medical condition clearly requires it. This happened in many cases. In Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, [(2021) 5 SCC 370], and later in Avni Prakash v. NTA, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1112] and the Arnab Roy v. Consortium of NLUs (CLAT case) (Writ Petition (Civil) No 1109 of 2022), the courts noticed that students with disabilities were being denied basic exam accommodations simply because authorities insisted on a benchmark disability requirement. The Supreme Court explained in very clear terms that reasonable accommodation is a right for every person with a disability, not only those who cross a particular percentage. The idea is to assess a person’s functional needs, not just a number.
This thinking was also reflected in the The Child (Rep. by her Mother) v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P.No. 24973 of 2022;W.M.P.No. 23909 of 2022), where a school that denied admission to a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder was chastised for violating Sections 3 and 16 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act. In this case, Madras High Court reaffirmed that inclusive education is not merely a policy objective but an enforceable legal right. The Court strongly reminded the school: “You advertised that you are inclusive. So, act like it.”
The same thing is also evident in the area of employment. Many people with disabilities are fully capable of doing their jobs, but are rejected because of outdated notions. For example, in Mohamed Ibrahim v. CMD, TANGEDCO (2023 INSC 914), a candidate was denied the post of Assistant Engineer because of mild colour blindness. The Supreme Court said that instead of excluding him, the employer should have checked whether he could work with reasonable adjustments.
Similarly, in Amit Yadav v. CAG (MANU/CA/0151/2023), a candidate with bipolar disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) was rejected without evaluating what work he could actually perform. The court relied on earlier Supreme Court judgments like Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal (Civil Appeal No.6924 of 2021) to say that disability, especially mental disability, must be understood in a broader social sense. Punishing someone or excluding someone only because of their disability violates their dignity and their right to equality. Disability, the Court held, is a social construct shaped by environmental barriers.
These decisions collectively assert that the right to dignified employment, protected under the Constitution of India through various Articles, including 14, 16, 19(1) (g), and 41, demands individualised assessments and functional evaluations rather than rigid reliance on disability percentages.
Courts have also protected disabled employees from unfair transfers. In Bhavneet Singh v. IRCON, (2023: DHC: 9447), the Delhi High Court said that transferring a disabled employee to a location where he cannot get regular medical treatment goes against the principle of reasonable accommodation.
However, in the Central Bank of India case [ILR (2023) MP1576], the Madhya Pradesh High Court clarified that these protections apply to persons with disabilities themselves, not automatically to caregivers, unless the law specifically states so. This again shows how the judiciary carefully balances rights with administrative needs.
Another important area where courts have stepped in is access to justice itself. In 2021 in Patan Jamal Vali (2021 SCC OnLine SC 343), the Supreme Court recognised how disability interacts with caste and gender, and how this can create deeper vulnerability.
The Delhi High Court in 2023 took this forward in the Rakesh Kumar Kalra case (2023: DHC: 6132), where the accused was both visually and hearing impaired. He could not follow the proceedings. The Court said that a trial where the accused cannot understand anything is not a fair trial at all. It directed courts to create accessible procedures, utilise technology, and even suggested the establishment of special courtrooms for individuals with disabilities. This is a powerful reminder that justice must be accessible to everyone, not only in theory, but also in everyday practice.
Accessibility does not stop at courts. It extends to public spaces, roads, buildings, buses, and even entertainment. In 2024, the Supreme Court’s continuing engagement in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2024 INSC 858), reaffirmed that accessibility of public spaces and transport is integral to Articles 14, 19, and 21. In 2024, the Court went further and struck down a rule that treated accessibility guidelines as optional, saying this weakens the purpose of the disability law.
In the cultural sphere, the Delhi High Court, in Akshat Baldwa v. Yash Raj Films (2024: DHC: 2417), dealt with a simple yet often overlooked issue: movies on OTT platforms without subtitles or audio descriptions. The Court held that entertainment must be inclusive, and directed that accessibility features be added. The judiciary has also commented on how persons with disabilities are portrayed on screen.
In Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures (2024 INSC 465), the Supreme Court reminded filmmakers to avoid humour that demeans or reinforces stereotypes. The courts’ contribution lies in distinguishing between: Disabling Humour v. Disability Humour. ‘Disabling Humour’ which demeans or objectifies persons with disabilities, reducing them to ridicule or pity and ‘Disability Humour’ which reclaims narrative agency, using humour to challenge ableist norms and normalize difference.
Perhaps the most impactful instance of judicial catalysis is in healthcare and insurance regulation. In Saurabh Shukla v. Niva Bupa (2023: DHC: 5964), the Delhi High Court confronted systemic discrimination against persons with spinal cord injuries who were routinely denied health insurance. The Court held that refusal of insurance solely on account of disability violates the RPwD Act, Article 21, and the IRDAI Regulations. As a direct result of sustained judicial pressure, twenty-nine insurance companies introduced disability-inclusive medical policies—an example of how judicial intervention can correct regulatory inertia and transform entire sectors.
These developments mirror the judiciary’s broader engagement with mobility and fiscal support. For example, the Madras High Court in Angappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. (MD) No.1480 of 2023), held that tax benefits for adapted vehicles cannot be restricted only to those who self-drive them. A person with an 80% locomotor disability may not be able to drive, but they still require accessible transportation. The Court’s purposive interpretation reflects a clear judicial understanding that laws designed to empower must be liberally applied, not narrowly construed.
Taken together, this rich body of jurisprudence demonstrates that the Indian judiciary has emerged as a powerful engine of social justice for persons with disabilities. Time and again, courts have filled legislative gaps, corrected executive apathy, and reinterpreted constitutional guarantees to ensure that dignity is not abstract. They have insisted that equality requires tailoring environments, not forcing individuals to fit pre-existing norms. But there is one more truth that these cases reveal. Most of the discrimination that persons with disabilities face is not intentional. It occurs due to a lack of awareness, insensitive procedures, outdated rules, and sometimes plain indifference.
The judiciary has stepped up again and again, but long-term social justice cannot rely only on litigation. Schools, hospitals, workplaces, public authorities, and society as a whole must take responsibility. The courts have shown us what equality looks like. Now we must make sure that this equality becomes a part of everyday life, without requiring judgment for every basic right.
The Supreme Court has rightly pointed out in Om Rathod v. DGHS (2024 INSC 836) that if persons with disabilities have to turn to the courts repeatedly to correct the missteps of authorities, then the rights recognised by this Court and the RPWD Act would risk becoming hollow assurances. Every such person who has the awareness or ability to move this Court may succeed in getting relief, whereas there are numerous others who will suffer in silence in absence of awareness and resources.
* Director, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi – 110001.
** Research Scholar, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi – 110001.